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INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), in
response to an application filed by the ICC Prosecutor, issued an
arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, the current sitting
president of Sudan. 2 The judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I
determined that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that AlBashir bears personal criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute

2. See generally Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf; Int’l Criminal Court, Office of
the Prosecutor, Situation in Darfur, the Sudan: Public Redacted Version of the
Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, ¶ 416, ICC-02/05 (July 14, 2008),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc559999.pdf [hereinafter
Prosecutor’s Application] (urging the Pre-Trial Chamber to find that there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that [President] Al-Bashir committed” crimes under
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to issue a warrant for his
arrest).
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of the ICC (“Rome Statute”) for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in Darfur, Sudan. 3 Specifically, the Court found
reason to believe that Al-Bashir directed branches of the Sudanese
government to implement a “common plan” with the aim of
subjecting the civilian population of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa
ethnic groups to “unlawful attacks, forcible transfers and acts of
murder, extermination, rape, torture, and pillage . . . .” 4 Ultimately,
the Court satisfied itself that, under Article 58 of the Rome Statute,
Al-Bashir’s arrest was necessary to guarantee his appearance at trial,
prohibit him from endangering the proceedings, and prevent further
atrocities in Darfur. 5
The ICC was formally established as a permanent international
criminal court in 2002 with the entry into force of the Rome Statute,
and Al-Bashir’s warrant represents the latest installment in a long
line of “firsts” that the ongoing conflict in Sudan has presented to the
fledgling institution. 6 The Darfur conflict is the first situation in
3. See Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad
Al Bashir, ¶¶ 209-223 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf [hereinafter Al-Bashir Warrant Decision]
(finding that Al-Bashir was an “indirect” perpetrator of crimes directly committed
by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Janjaweed Militias, and other branches of the
Sudanese state). Though the Prosecutor initially alleged that Al-Bashir was
complicit in genocide as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity, the PreTrial Chamber majority found that the totality of the Prosecutor’s evidence failed
to establish reasonable grounds to believe the Government of Sudan acted with the
requisite specific intent necessary to support a charge of genocide. Id. ¶¶ 205-206.
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the court jurisdiction
over: “(a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes;
[and] (d) The crime of aggression”).
4. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 214-216 (finding that the
unlawful attacks on civilians were a part of a larger counter-insurgency strategy
against rebel groups in Darfur).
5. See id. ¶¶ 227-236 (stressing Al-Bashir’s refusal to execute two previous
ICC warrants, his public defiance of the Court’s jurisdiction in Sudan, the
conviction of a Sudanese official for treason because of his cooperation with the
ICC, and the recent attack on an internally displaced persons (“IDP”) camp by
Sudanese government forces); see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(1)(b)
(authorizing the Court to issue an arrest warrant if it appears necessary: “(i) To
ensure the person’s appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not
obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) Where
applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that
crime . . . ”).
6. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. (recognizing that the numerous
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which the Court’s jurisdiction has been activated by a referral from
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 7
The cases arising out of Darfur are the first instances that the Court
has sought to exercise its jurisdiction over nationals of a non-State
Party to the Rome Statute that has not consented to the Court’s
jurisdiction. 8 Finally, although the Rome Statute allows the ICC to
disregard a suspect’s official title, 9 Al-Bashir’s indictment is the first
time that the ICC has been asked to exercise its jurisdiction over an

atrocities committed over the course of the twentieth century were the impetus for
the creation of the ICC); Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, ‘This Prosecution Will
Endanger the People We Wish to Defend in Sudan’, The Observer, July 13, 2008,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/13/sudan.humanrights
(noting that Al-Bashir is the first incumbent Head of State indicted by the ICC and
arguing that the indictment is a mistake because of the danger it will be ineffective,
spur Al-Bashir to retreat from peace negotiations, and cause more suffering among
Darfur’s civilian population); see also A Dilemma Over Darfur: Calculating the
Consequences of Indicting Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, for Genocide and
More, Economist.com, July 15, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/
international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11737170 [hereinafter A Dilemma Over
Darfur] (recognizing the unprecedented nature of the Prosecutor’s request and the
diplomatic pressure on the Prosecutor not to “aim for the top” in acting against the
Sudanese government).
7. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b) (stipulating that the Security
Council must act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to refer a situation
to the ICC); S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005)
(referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC because the conflict threatens
international peace and security); Young Sok Kim, The Law of the International
Criminal Court 1 (2007) (asserting that the ICC is meant to “contribute to the
preservation, restoration and maintenance of international peace and security”);
Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council's Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to
the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court:
Implications for the International Criminal Court's Functions and Status, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 650, 652-53 (2006) (recognizing that the referral was
unexpected, as the United States had voiced its opposition to using the Court to
address the situation in Darfur and was expected to veto such a move). See
generally U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (providing the Security Council with the power
to act when international peace is threatened or breached, or in response to acts of
aggression).
8. See Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur—Savior or Spoiler?, 14 ISLA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 146 (2007) (recognizing that although Sudan is a signatory
to the Rome Statute, it has not yet ratified the Statute and has repeatedly rejected
ICC jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals).
9. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 27 (making official titles, such
as Head of State, irrelevant before the ICC and directing the Court to ignore the
privileges usually associated with such titles).
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individual who, as a sitting president, is entitled to the international
protections provided by the doctrine of Head of State immunity. 10
The focus of this Comment is twofold. First, it analyzes the bases
of the ICC’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over Al-Bashir given
Sudan’s rejection of the Court’s validity and Al-Bashir’s position as
Head of State. 11 After concluding that the Rome Statute and U.N.
Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur situation to the ICC,
furnish the Court with the legal authority to prosecute Al-Bashir, the
analysis then shifts to the second focus: the practical limitations that
these two documents and customary international law impose on the
enforcement of Al-Bashir’s arrest warrant. 12 This Comment argues
that, given the Rome Statute’s prohibition on trials in absentia and
the ICC’s dependence on states to carry out its warrants, Al-Bashir’s
Head of State immunities could prevent states from arresting him,
even in the face of a valid ICC warrant. 13
10. See Braced for the Aftershock, The Economist, Mar. 7, 2009, at 66-67
(highlighting the possible ramifications of the ICC’s arrest warrant on United
Nations forces in Sudan and presenting arguments for and against the U.N.
Security Council’s decision to defer Al-Bashir’s warrant); see also A Dilemma
over Darfur, supra note 6 (reporting that although other Heads of State such as
Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic have been indicted in international
tribunals, Al-Bashir’s case represents the first time the ICC has done so). See
generally Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 106-08
(2004) (providing a general history of the Head of State immunity doctrine from
the 16th century through the creation of the Rome Statute).
11. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the
International Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 419-32 (2004) (discussing
how immunity-possessing officials of non-State Parties, State Parties, and
international organizations may be treated under the Rome Statute).
12. See, e.g., Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-59 (exposing potential problems
caused by the language of the Security Council referral including the lack of a
requirement that states not party to the conflict in Darfur render assistance to the
Prosecutor, the failure to provide any material support to the ICC’s investigations,
and an exemption from ICC jurisdiction for all American citizens and all “current
or former officials or personnel” from non-State Parties other than Sudan).
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 63 (providing that “[t]he accused shall
be present during the trial”); Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International
Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law, in The International
Criminal Court: Challenges to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st
Century 285, 287, 291 (Mark S. Ellis & Richard J. Goldstone eds., 2008) (arguing
that the ICC is needed as a mechanism to enforce international criminal law and
urging states to cooperate with the Court because the ICC does not have a police
force that can execute its warrants); see also Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The
International Criminal Court: Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the
Rome Statute, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 209-16 (2006) (raising
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In order to give some context to the ICC’s involvement in Sudan,
Part I of this Comment traces the history of the conflict in Darfur and
the response of the international community. It also lays out a brief
history of the initial rationales behind the Head of State immunity
doctrine and traces the evolution of the doctrine to its current
boundaries. Part II analyzes the legality and enforceability of the
ICC’s warrant for Al-Bashir in light of the relevant Rome Statute
provisions, previous cases in international courts, customary
international law, and the limitations imposed by U.N. Resolution
1593. Part III then argues that the U.N. Security Council should
refrain from deferring Al-Bashir’s warrant and instead recommends
that the Security Council issue a more definitive resolution to ensure
that Al-Bashir’s immunities do not prevent states from executing his
warrant. It also suggests amending the Rome Statute to ensure that,
in the case of a Security Council referral, all U.N. Member States are
placed under international obligations to disregard a suspect’s
international immunities and enforce ICC warrants.

I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE SITUATION IN DARFUR AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The Darfur region of Sudan is a vast, arid, and ethnically diverse
territory. 14 It covers some 150,000 square miles and, by some
accounts, its six million inhabitants belong to some forty to ninety
tribes or ethnic groups. 15 These tribes can be roughly grouped into
questions about the ICC’s ability to function effectively given its reliance upon the
cooperation of individual states and the impact of immunity agreements on
cooperation).
14. See Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide 2 (2005)
(contrasting the fairly uniform geography and climate of the region to the diverse
ethnic makeup of its inhabitants).
15. See Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter ICID Report] (stating that while there are
various urban centers across the region, most of the population live in small
villages made up of “a few hundred families”); JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL,
DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 8-10 (2005) (explaining how
Darfur’s history as an independent sultanate, human migration route, and target for
invasion led to the ethnic diversity of the region); Prunier, supra note 14, at 2-3
(describing the territory as an enormous plain encircling a relatively small

904

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:897

those that live mainly sedentary lifestyles, and those who are
nomadic or semi-nomadic. 16 Today, Darfur is most known for the
brutal conflict that exploded in 2004 and has now led to allegations
that the most serious of all international crimes—genocide—was
committed in the region. 17
Historically, inter-tribal conflicts in Darfur that arose out of land
disputes were effectively settled through traditional legal systems
administered by tribal leaders. 18 By the mid-1980s, however, these
structures had been abolished by the Government of Sudan (“GoS”)
in favor of local administrations consisting of officials appointed
from the Sudanese capitol, Khartoum. 19 These imposed
arrangements, however, proved to be ineffective in resolving
renewed clashes between the Darfur tribes that were fueled by long
droughts, increasing desertification, and the proliferation of weapons
throughout the region. 20 Through the remainder of the 1980s and into
the 1990s, these inter-tribal conflicts continued to simmer. 21 During
mountainous area).
16. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 52 (explaining further that the sedentary
tribes are composed of both agriculturalist tribes including the Fur and Masalit,
and cattle herding tribes including the Zaghawa, while the nomadic tribes are
primarily cattle or camel herders).
17. See Prunier, supra note 14, at vii-xi (tracing the international community’s
recognition and response to the unfolding situation in Darfur in 2004); see also
Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (accusing Al-Bashir of genocide
against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups by deliberately imposing
“conditions of life calculated to bring about [the groups’] physical destruction in
part”); ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 52, 55, 62 (finding that the recent violence
in Darfur is attributable, in part, to historical divisions in identity between tribes,
disputes over scarce resources, limited opportunities for participation in the
national political system, and the government’s perceived marginalization of
Darfur).
18. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 57 (describing traditional conflict
resolution structures in which tribal leaders would negotiate mutually acceptable
compromises to disputes).
19. See id. (explaining that the change in structure weakened the power of the
tribal dispute resolution mechanism because the state was no longer viewed as
impartial in mediating such disputes).
20. See id. ¶¶ 55, 59 (establishing the relationship between desertification and
increased conflicts because of land shortages and describing the failure of the
government to effectively mediate these conflicts); id. ¶ 58 (implicating Chad and
Libya in the spread of arms throughout the area and describing the formation of
tribal militias).
21. See id. ¶ 59 (describing clashes between the “Arab Gathering,” composed
mostly of the region’s nomadic tribes, and the “African Belt” that was created by
members of the sedentary Fur tribe).
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this time, tribal divisions in Darfur widened, and, for the first time,
the terms “Arab” and “African” arose as meaningful distinctions
between the region’s mostly sedentary African tribes and the mainly
nomadic Arab tribes who otherwise shared a common language
(Arabic) and religion (Islam). 22
As disputes in Darfur rose to a boil in the late 1990s, President AlBashir’s government effectively ignored the region. 23 This neglect
led to the formation of several rebel groups in protest to the political
and economic marginalization of Darfur’s population. 24 Although
their policies differed, the two largest rebel groups both stressed the
need for greater political participation in Sudan, and drew their
members from the same three African tribes: the Fur, the Masalit,
and the Zaghawa. 25
Finally, in early 2003, the Darfur cauldron boiled over. 26 By this
time, a low-level war was already smoldering across the region, with
the rebels’ staging numerous attacks on police stations and army
encampments to which the government responded with both ground
and air attacks. 27 Between February and April, 2003, the rebels
22. See id. ¶ 60 (detailing the increasing significance of the “Arab” or
“African” distinction throughout this time period, which in the past was more of a
“passive distinction”); id. ¶ 52 (pointing out the religious and linguistic
commonalities of the inhabitants of Darfur); see also Kastner, supra note 8, at 15657 (detailing the “Arab-Islamist” GoS’s alleged complicity in the creation of racist
divisions between the Arab and African tribes); Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring
the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent
Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 188-89 (2006) (describing how the
government encouraged the formation of an Arab alliance in Darfur to prevent
dissent among the African tribes and then forcibly disarmed non-Arabs).
23. See Kastner, supra note 8, at 155-56 (outlining the government’s
continuation of the British colonial policy of “deliberate underdevelopment” of
Darfur throughout the 1980s and 1990s).
24. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 62 (outlining the formation and
motivations of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (“SLM/A”) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (“JEM”), which included, inter alia, greater political
participation for the inhabitants of Darfur in the national government).
25. See id. (recognizing that despite their similar policies and support base, the
policies of the SLM/A and the JEM formed as a result of different influences: the
JEM was influenced largely by the ideals of political Islam, and the SLM/A drew
its principles from the “New Sudan” policies of the SPLM/A, the main rebel group
in the South Sudan civil war that began in 1983).
26. See Kastner, supra note 8, at 157 (describing a February 2003 SLM/A
attack on the town of Golu, which killed two hundred government soldiers).
27. See FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 76 (positing that
the rebellion began in 2001, but was not noticed by the international community
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conducted a series of high profile attacks on government forces in
several towns in Darfur. 28 Initially, it appeared that the GoS was illequipped to respond to these attacks. 29 At the time, the GoS was
conducting peace negotiations with the Sudanese People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”), its main opponent in the civil war in
South Sudan that had been raging since 1983. 30 Most of the GoS
forces were still located in the south, and the forces it did have in
Darfur were composed mostly of local Darfuris whom the
government did not trust to fight their “own” people. 31 This lack of
government resources in the area led the GoS to use two tactics that
proved instrumental in shaping the nature of the conflict in Darfur
and ultimately contributed to the massive humanitarian violations
that followed. 32
First, faced with a severe lack of military capabilities on the
ground and a dearth of training in desert warfare, Khartoum began to
call upon local tribes in Darfur to aid in the fight against the rebels. 33
Members of the mostly nomadic Arab tribes, sensing an opportunity

until 2003).
28. See generally Prunier, supra note 14, at 92, 95-96 (providing a timeline of
major rebel attacks in Darfur, culminating with the audacious attack on the town of
El Fashir during which the rebels occupied a government military airport). Prunier
further reports that, “according to U.S. sources [the rebels] also executed around
200 army prisoners after they had surrendered . . . .” Id. at 96.
29. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 66 (attributing the government’s
inability to respond to the attacks to the significant deployment of the military to
the south and the minimal presence of the military in Darfur’s urban centers); see
also FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 99-101 (stating that the
government’s forces were initially overwhelmed by the tactics employed by the
rebels, who utilized small, highly mobile teams of vehicles to strike unexpectedly
in different areas).
30. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 50 (describing the civil war in South
Sudan and the peace process that culminated with a 2005 agreement providing for
the possibility of self-determination for southern Sudan).
31. See id. ¶ 66; cf. Kastner, supra note 8, at 157 (stating further that the GoS
hoped to destroy the insurrection in Darfur before it could unravel the peace
process in South Sudan).
32. See FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 101-02 (asserting
that the GoS knew that arming and using Darfuri tribes against each other would
inevitably result in violations of human rights).
33. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 67 (indicating that the choice to use local
tribes was consciously made to take advantage of existing tribal tensions); FLINT &
DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 99 (detailing how the army’s lack of
training in desert ground warfare resulted in numerous defeats and forced the army
to rely almost exclusively on the air force).
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to gain lands and resources, volunteered to serve in militias used to
supplement government forces in Darfur. 34 These militias, now
known by the name given to them by their victims—Janjaweed
(“devil on horseback”)—served to augment the regular army and
proved to be extremely effective tools in the government’s efforts to
crush the Darfur rebellion. 35 Second, fearful of the support that the
Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes were providing to the rebels, the
Sudanese army and its affiliated Janjaweed militias began to
indiscriminately target civilian villages. 36 As the conflict progressed,
a general pattern of these attacks began to emerge. 37 According to the
victims, GoS bombers usually arrived first, raining cluster-bombs
down upon the villages. 38 Following the air assaults, Janjaweed
militias, at times accompanied by the regular army, emerged and
surrounded the targeted village. 39 Moving in, the Janjaweed
proceeded to loot the property, execute military-aged men, rape the
women and girls, and burn what was left, leaving the survivors to
find their way to ever-growing displacement camps. 40 It is this
pattern of attacks that the ICC Prosecutor cited as evidence that the
Sudanese government, led by Al-Bashir, deliberately created
34. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 68 (explaining that the government
recruited militiamen not only from certain tribes within Darfur, but from Chad and
Libya as well); FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 102-03
(illustrating how the GoS gained the support of Arab tribes through bribing tribal
leaders, offering development assistance to Arab communities, and updating the
militias’ weaponry).
35. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 100 (defining the term “Janjaweed”); see
also FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 104-05 (concluding that
the militias were integral for the government in “turning the tide” of the war).
36. See, e.g., Kastner, supra note 8, at 159 (positing that villages were attacked
with little regard for the presence of rebel soldiers); see also ICID Report, supra
note 15, ¶ 236 (finding that some 700 villages had been wholly or partially
destroyed across the region).
37. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 241 (stating further that most attacks
began at or before dawn when most of the civilians were at prayer or still asleep).
38. See Prunier, supra note 14, at 99-100 (recounting how the GoS used
transport planes as bombers by rolling oil barrels filled with explosives out of the
cargo-bays with the clear intent of these devices to impact civilians).
39. See generally Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 1009-12 (2008) (giving a series of eye-witness accounts
highlighting the cooperation between the Sudanese armed forces and the
Janjaweed).
40. See Prunier, supra note 14, at 100, 102-03 (concluding that the ultimate
goal of these attacks was to concentrate the populace in certain areas to prevent
support of the rebels).
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“conditions of life calculated to bring about [the] physical
destruction” of a substantial part of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa
ethnic groups. 41
1. The United Nations and the Darfur Conflict
The United Nations Security Council initially addressed the
situation in Darfur in 2004. 42 In September of that year, the Security
Council authorized the Secretary-General to create a Commission of
Inquiry to “investigate reports of violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur by all parties . . . .” 43 In
January 2005, the Commission of Inquiry reported its findings to the
Security Council. 44 The Commission ultimately concluded that the
GoS had not pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur. 45 The
Commission did, however, implicate the GoS and the Janjaweed in
“serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law amounting to crimes under international law.” 46 In light of these
findings, the Commission recommended that the Security Council
refer the Darfur situation to the ICC. 47
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, with the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security, to refer situations to the
Prosecutor of the ICC. 48 In Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005, the

41. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 10 (holding Al-Bashir
personally responsible for the actions of the Sudanese armed forces and their
Janjaweed extensions).
42. See S.C. Res. 1556, ¶¶ 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004)
(prohibiting arms sales to non-state actors in Darfur and specifically mentioning
the Janjaweed).
43. S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004) (calling on
all parties to the conflict in Sudan to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry).
44. ICID Report, supra note 15, at 1.
45. See id. at 4 (reporting that while two elements of the crime of genocide, the
actus reus and the existence of a protected group, were present, the essential
element of genocidal “intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group
distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds,” was lacking).
46. See id. at 3 (finding that the GoS and Janjaweed militias committed
numerous crimes, including indiscriminate attacks against villages, torture, killing
of civilians, rape, and forced displacement of civilians).
47. See id. ¶ 569 (concluding that Sudan’s judicial system is unable to hold
perpetrators accountable and the government authorities are disinclined to do so).
48. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b); see Heyder, supra note 7, at 652-53
(stating further that because the Court’s jurisdiction granted pursuant to an Article
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Security Council, following the recommendations of the Commission
of Inquiry, invoked Article 13(b) for the first time and referred the
situation in Darfur to the ICC. 49 Resolution 1593 provided the ICC
with jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Darfur since July
1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute entered into force. 50 By making
this referral, the Security Council acknowledged that the events in
Darfur represented a threat to international peace and security and,
for the first time, designated the ICC as a major instrument in
rectifying such threats. 51
2. Previous Actions Taken by the International Criminal Court with
Respect to Darfur
Following the Security Council’s referral, the ICC Prosecutor
formally opened his investigation on June 6, 2005, promising to
focus on “the individuals who bear the greatest criminal
responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur.” 52 In April 2007,
subsequent to the Prosecutor’s investigations, the ICC issued arrest
warrants for Ahmad Harun, Sudan’s Minister of State for the Interior
from 2003 to 2005, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader. 53
The ICC found that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that
both Harun and Ali Kushayb were responsible for war crimes and
13(b) referral is anchored in the U.N. Charter, its jurisdiction is much stronger than
it otherwise would be, “rendering irrelevant the consent of the state where the
crime occurred”).
49. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1; see U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg.
at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Argentina’s Statement]
(acknowledging the important precedent set by the Security Council’s referral to
the ICC).
50. Rome Statute, supra note 3; S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1.
51. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, pmbl.; see Argentina’s Statement, supra note
49, at 7 (characterizing the ICC as an “essential tool” in the international human
rights system).
52. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens
Investigation in Darfur (June 6, 2005), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/NR/exeres/31F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9E0A-A6A8DAC308EB.htm (calling
on the international community to support the Office of the Prosecutor during the
investigations).
53. See Prosecutor v. Harun & Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/0501/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute,
¶¶ 80-88, 95-103 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279807.PDF (citing evidence that Harun oversaw the
recruitment of Janjaweed militias, and Kushayb commanded Janjaweed in their
attacks upon the villages).
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crimes against humanity committed in Darfur and requested Sudan to
transfer both suspects to The Hague. 54 Then, on July 14, 2008, in
light of Al-Bashir’s continued obstructions of the ICC’s prosecution
of Sudanese officials, the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for
President Al-Bashir himself. 55 In granting the Prosecutor’s warrant
application on March 4, 2009, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I
explicitly determined that Al-Bashir’s position as head of state of a
non-state party to the Rome Statute had “no effect on the Court’s
jurisdiction . . . .” 56
For its part, Sudan has completely rejected the Court’s jurisdiction
over its territory, and Al-Bashir has “categorically refused” to
surrender any Sudanese national, including himself, to the ICC. 57 As
noted by the Prosecutor in his application for Al-Bashir’s arrest
warrant, Sudan has not arrested either Ali Kushayb or Ahmad Harun,
the latter of whom now serves as Sudan’s Minister of State for
Humanitarian Affairs. 58 In addition to Al-Bashir’s repeated
denunciations of the ICC’s jurisdiction in Sudan, it is likely that AlBashir will contest his ICC arrest warrant on the grounds that his
Head of State immunities present a complete bar to his arrest and

54. See id. ¶¶ 56, 89, 94, 107 (recognizing that Resolution 1593 placed an
international obligation on Sudan to arrest and transfer the two suspects).
55. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶¶ 44, 65, 343 (describing how
Al-Bashir protected those who followed his orders by refusing to cooperate with
the Court as well as his refusal to turn Harun over to the ICC).
56. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 40-41 (citing the Security
Council’s referral as authority to exercise jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals
despite Sudan’s non-party status). The Court found that it had the authority to
disregard Al-Bashir’s position as head of state based upon four considerations. Id.
¶ 42. First, one of the Rome Statute’s fundamental goals is to “put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes . . . .” Id. Second, Article
27 of the Rome Statute provides that no international immunities “shall . . . exempt
a person from criminal responsibility under [the Rome] Statute.” Id. ¶ 43. Third,
the Court will only resort to general principles and rules of international law when
there is an explicit lacuna in the text of the Rome Statute. Id. ¶ 44; see also Rome
Statute, supra note 3, art. 21. Fourth, when the Security Council referred the
Darfur situation to the ICC, it accepted that the investigation and prosecutions
would “take place in accordance with the statutory framework provided for in the
[Rome] Statute . . . .” Id. ¶ 45.
57. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 412 (alleging further that AlBashir’s position as Head of State allows him the unique ability to obstruct the
judicial proceedings in Sudan).
58. See id. ¶ 65 (stating further that the GoS has completely terminated any
cooperation with the Prosecutor’s office).
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prosecution. 59 The success of this argument depends upon the nature
and the scope of the doctrine of Head of State immunity and its
applicability to international criminal tribunals such as the ICC. 60

B. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Before discussing whether Al-Bashir’s position protects him from
ICC prosecution, it is necessary to highlight the difference between
the rules that govern the jurisdiction of a court and those that govern
international immunity from jurisdiction. 61 The concept of
jurisdiction relates to the power of a specific court to exercise its
authority over a specific individual. 62 International immunities, on
the other hand, serve to protect certain individuals from trial in
foreign courts in the interests of international comity and sovereign
equality. 63 In the Arrest Warrant Case, the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) stated that “jurisdiction does not imply absence of
immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction.” 64
Thus, in the case of Darfur, the ICC may have valid jurisdiction over
Al-Bashir as a Sudanese national and yet still be prevented from

59. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the
International Criminal Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 38 (2005) (arguing
that Al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials will seek to rely on the customary
international law of absolute inviolability of Heads of State, which prevents
foreign courts from prosecuting sovereigns when acting within their official
duties).
60. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417-18
(asserting that the use of an international immunity before an international court
depends upon the type of immunity and the nature of the tribunal).
61. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3, 24-25 (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case] (stressing the
importance of distinguishing between the separate concepts of jurisdiction and
jurisdictional immunities).
62. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 7, at 111 (defining jurisdiction as “the right,
power, or authority to administer justice”).
63. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3) (Pinochet III), (1999) 1 A.C. 147, 201, 210 (H.L.) (U.K.)
[hereinafter Pinochet III] (emphasizing that, under international law, sovereigns
should not pass judgment on one another).
64. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 24-25 (explaining further that
even when a court’s jurisdiction is granted pursuant to an international convention,
the availability of customary international law immunities remains).
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exercising that jurisdiction by the international immunities he enjoys
as Head of State. 65
1. Origins and Twentieth Century Evolution of the Doctrine
The doctrine of Head of State immunity originally arose out of the
combined concepts of sovereign equality among states and the
“absolute” identification between the state itself and the leader of
the state. 66 Under this system, the Head of State, as the embodiment
of the sovereign power of the state itself, was absolutely immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 67 This customary rule was
based upon reciprocity between states, as well as the need to
facilitate inter-state communication and negotiation. 68
In the twentieth century, concurrent with the rise of supra-national
institutions, cracks began to emerge in the absolute nature of the
Head of State immunity doctrine, especially when it came to the
most serious international crimes. 69 Following the end of the Second
World War, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal explicitly
revoked Head of State immunity for Nazi war criminal suspects
under its jurisdiction. 70 Such efforts worked to separate the
65. Cf. Daniel M. Singerman, It’s Still Good to be the King: An Argument for
Maintaining the Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 413, 441-46 (2007) (asserting that despite the erosions caused by the
proliferation of international criminal law, the doctrine of Head of State immunity
is highly resilient).
66. See Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of
Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the
United States that are not Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 463, 466-67 (2006) (positing that the earliest forms
of Head of State immunity were based on “reciprocity, convenience, and
practicality”); see also Singerman, supra note 65, at 418 (describing the principle
of sovereign equality as a bar to states’ passing judgment on the actions of other
states).
67. Cf. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 116, 137-38
(1812) (discussing the absolute inviolability of the person of the sovereign when he
is within the territory of a consenting foreign state).
68. See id. at 136 (declaring that states mutually benefit by communicating
with each other).
69. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 66, at 482-86 (stating that the Nuremberg
Charter was the culmination of a series of attempts to narrow the scope of the
doctrine that began shortly after World War I).
70. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (“The official position of defendants, whether as
Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
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individual ruler of a state from that state’s inherent sovereignty, a
notion that increasingly became identified with the will of a state’s
citizens rather than personified by its leader. 71 As the century
progressed and international criminal law began to solidify through
various treaties, the use of international criminal tribunals
proliferated, and more wrinkles emerged in the Head of State
immunity doctrine. 72
2. The Current Status of the Doctrine: Two Important Distinctions
Unlike diplomatic immunity, which is codified in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, there is no international
agreement delineating the parameters of Head of State immunity. 73
Thus, determining the doctrine’s current boundaries requires sifting
through the increasingly numerous decisions emanating from both
domestic and international courts. 74 The picture that emerges from
this process, while somewhat muddled, can be roughly characterized

considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”); see
also Singerman, supra note 65, at 429-30 (describing the post-World War II
recognition that Heads of State were subject to international law).
71. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 427-28 (illustrating the shifts in
customary international law philosophy that de-emphasized the role of the leader
and placed him on a level of immunity similar to that enjoyed by a diplomat).
72. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (revoking the Head of State
immunity doctrine as a defense to crimes prosecuted through the ICC); Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1112 Stat. 2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (establishing torture as an
international crime with no qualifications on who may be held accountable, and
creating a Committee to investigate alleged instances of torture); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (criminalizing genocide committed by any individual,
regardless of whether he or she is a Head of State); The Secretary-General, Report
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), ¶¶ 53-59, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May
3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] (setting forth the law and principles guiding the ICTY’s
approach to individual criminal responsibility and explicitly repudiating the
defense of Head of State immunity).
73. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (laying out the rights and obligations of states with respect to foreign
ambassadors); Singerman, supra note 68, at 427 (lamenting the lack of codified
principles for Head of State immunity).
74. See generally Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at
409-15 (relying on numerous cases, both domestic and international, to outline the
extent of immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae).
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by two important distinctions that dominate the current debate about
when Head of State immunity is applicable. 75
a. The Immunity Ratione Personae and Immunity Ratione Materiae
Distinction

The first of these distinctions is between personal immunity
(immunity ratione personae) and act of state immunity (immunity
ratione materiae), and serves to separate the immunities available to
sitting Heads of State from those available to former Heads of
State. 76 Immunity ratione personae is absolute and attaches to an
incumbent Head of State’s person while he is in office, rendering
him completely immune and inviolable from prosecution in foreign
courts, even when he is suspected of committing crimes against
humanity. 77 Further, this complete prosecutorial bar applies
regardless of whether the Head of State committed the acts in
question in his official capacity. 78 Immunity ratione personae is
justified by the recognition that the international system is dependent
upon peaceful cooperation between states and, as the primary
representatives of states, Heads of State must be allowed to conduct
relations without fear of prosecution. 79
75. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 427.
76. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, ¶ 18(b) (May 31, 2004) (presenting Professor Diane
Orentlicher’s arguments from her amicus brief that stress the need to differentiate
between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae when
deciding whether Charles Taylor, as a Head of State, should be immune from the
jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”)); see also Akande,
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 409 (highlighting the difference
between the “broad” immunity ratione personae that some officials are granted
because of the office they hold, and the more limited immunity ratione materiae
that attaches only to an individual’s official acts).
77. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 201-02 (explaining further that the
immunity of a sitting Head of State is the “same immunity as the state itself”);
Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 24-25 (finding that there is no exception to
the customary international law of absolute immunity ratione personae for crimes
against humanity).
78. Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 22 (stating that when immunity
ratione personae is found there is “no distinction” between official and private
acts, and the immunity covers acts performed by the individual before taking
office).
79. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 409-10
(noting that this immunity is afforded only to that small group of officials with the
responsibility of conducting foreign relations, including (1) heads of State, (2)
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In contrast, immunity ratione materiae is more limited in scope
but broader in the number of officials that it protects. 80 Immunity
ratione materiae attaches to the acts of state representatives
performed in their official capacity. 81 Unlike immunity ratione
personae, immunity ratione materiae applies to the acts of state
officials that were conducted in their official capacity even after the
individuals have left office. 82 This immunity is justified by the theory
that official actions are not done to benefit the individual, but rather
are performed on behalf of the state. 83 The purposes of immunity
ratione materiae, therefore, are to protect the individual from
responsibility for state actions and to prevent foreign courts from
passing judgment on a sovereign state by prosecuting those who act
on its behalf. 84 While in office, Heads of State possess both
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. 85
b. The Distinction between the Availability of Head of State Immunities in
Domestic Courts Versus their Use in International Courts

In the Arrest Warrant Case, the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) held that a Belgian arrest warrant issued for the incumbent
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo on charges of
crimes against humanity violated international law because it “failed
to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction” enjoyed by the

heads of government, and (3) foreign ministers).
80. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 148 (holding that immunity ratione
materiae does not extend to official acts that violate jus cogens norms); Akande,
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 412-13 (asserting that immunity
ratione materiae extends to lower-level state officials whose positions do not
warrant immunity ratione personae.
81. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 202 (finding that any state official has
immunity in foreign courts with respect to his official actions).
82. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 123 (stating that upon leaving office, an
official’s immunity ratione materiae becomes his only protection from
prosecution, regardless of whether he had previously been granted immunity
ratione personae).
83. See id. at 109-10 (declaring further that immunity ratione materiae applies
to all conduct that is “directly attributable to state action”).
84. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 413; see also
Simbeye, supra note 10, at 123 (describing the “two pronged” protection of
immunity ratione materiae, which includes immunity for the individual and the
“non-justiciability for the act itself”).
85. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 109.
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Minister. 86 This decision made clear that, at the time, under
international law domestic courts could not exercise jurisdiction over
sitting foreign ministers or Heads of State who possess valid
immunity ratione personae, even when they are charged with crimes
against humanity. 87 The power of domestic courts to adjudicate over
former Heads of State, however, has been greatly enhanced in recent
years. 88 Although still somewhat in flux, it seems settled that
domestic courts can exercise jurisdiction over former Heads of State
for violations of international criminal law they committed while in
office. 89
In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ also recognized that the
limitations that a Head of State’s immunities impose on domestic
courts would not always present a difficulty to certain international
criminal tribunals. 90 Indeed, the enacting documents of various
international courts, including the ICC, contain provisions that
explicitly make a suspect’s international immunities irrelevant. 91 In
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“SCSL”) concluded that because the court was “part of the
machinery of international justice” with jurisdiction over
international crimes committed in Sierra Leone, it possessed the
86. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 33 (declaring further that
Belgium was obligated to cancel the arrest warrant and inform international
authorities that it had done so).
87. See id. at 22 (finding that sitting Heads of State, heads of government, and
foreign ministers are afforded absolute immunity and inviolability while they are
in office).
88. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 25 (recognizing exceptions to
the immunities granted to a former foreign minister, including that he does not
have immunity from suit in courts in his home state, he cannot claim immunity if
immunity is waived by his home state, he can be subject to the criminal courts of
another state for “private” acts committed while in office, and where international
courts have jurisdiction, he can be forced to participate in their criminal
proceedings).
89. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 148 (determining that in the light of the
International Convention against Torture, former heads of state do not have
immunity for official acts of torture); see also Akande, International Law
Immunities, supra note 11, at 413-15 (stating that immunity ratione materiae does
not apply to an individual charged with an international crime); Summers, supra
note 66, at 480-81 (finding an exception to immunity ratione materiae in the case
of “core” international crimes).
90. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 25 (listing the ICTY, ICTR, and
ICC as possible venues).
91. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (eliminating both immunity ratione
personae and immunity ratione materiae as defenses before the ICC).
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authority to disregard the immunities of Charles Taylor, the
incumbent Liberian Head of State at the time the SCSL issued his
arrest warrant. 92 In light of the above, it is apparent that international
criminal tribunals have much greater authority under international
law than domestic courts to prosecute sitting Heads of State. 93 As the
case of Al-Bashir illustrates, however, the assumption that an
international court’s judicial power extends to all Heads of State in
every situation is subject to several caveats. The most important
caveat is whether the individual’s state is bound by that court’s
rulings. 94

II. ANALYSIS
The Rome Statute was enacted with the dual objectives of
eliminating impunity for the perpetrators of crimes that “shock the
conscience of humanity,” while guaranteeing respect for the internal
affairs of states. 95 These goals led to the creation of a juridical
system tasked with the sometimes competing mandates of holding
accountable those individuals most culpable of international crimes,
while ensuring that doing so does not infringe upon the rights of
states. 96 The situation in Sudan, and especially the warrant for AlBashir, provides a unique opportunity to observe the ICC’s ability to
walk this fine and sometimes precarious line between the need for
individual accountability and respect for state sovereignty. 97
92. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 37-39, 53 (May 31, 2004) (determining that the SCSL had
this authority because its treaty was enacted by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter).
93. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 91 (suggesting that even though immunities
are not irrelevant to international courts, the “vertical” relationship between the
international tribunal and the state limits the state’s sovereignty).
94. See, e.g., Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 418
(concluding that before an international court has the authority to disregard an
individual’s immunities, the tribunal’s founding instruments must provide for the
removal of immunities, and the individual’s state must be bound by those
instruments).
95. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
96. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July
1997, ¶ 40 (Oct. 29, 1997) (recognizing the reality that international tribunals take
into account the sovereignty of independent states).
97. See Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court
and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity 16-18 (2008)
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A. THE ROME STATUTE AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1593 GRANT THE ICC POWER TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER
ACTS COMMITTED IN SUDAN
Before the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a specific crime, its
authority over the situation in which the crime was committed must
be activated by one of the three “trigger mechanisms” outlined in the
Rome Statute. 98 Article 13 of the Rome Statute allows triggering of
the ICC’s jurisdiction by a referral from a State Party, a Security
Council referral, or through the Prosecutor’s independent initiation
of an investigation. 99 Once the ICC’s authority over a general
situation has been triggered, the Court is also required, sua sponte, to
verify that it has jurisdiction over a specific individual before it. 100
In the case of Sudan, the Security Council triggered the ICC’s
authority by referral in Resolution 1593. 101 The extent of the ICC’s
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Sudan, therefore, requires a
concurrent reading of the applicable Rome Statute provisions and
Security Council Resolution 1593. 102 Thus, in determining whether it
has specific jurisdiction over Al-Bashir, the ICC must first establish
(stating that the Rome Statute “challenges traditional views on state sovereignty”
by placing constraints on sovereignty to allow the ICC to pursue its mandate).
98. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13; see also Philippe Kirsch, QC & Darryl
Robinson, Referral by States Parties, in The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary 619, 619 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)
(describing the term “trigger mechanism” as “the ability to direct the Court’s
attention to events in a particular time and place, . . . with a view to initiating an
exercise of jurisdiction over those events”).
99. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13.
100. See id. art. 19(1) (providing further that the Court, after establishing that it
has jurisdiction, may decide to make a determination of the admissibility of a
specific case); see also Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 35
(acknowledging that Article 19(1) requires the Court to establish its jurisdiction in
every case brought before it).
101. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1 (using Chapter VII authority to do
so).
102. See Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the
Security Council, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary, supra note 98, at 627, 634 (asserting that while a Security Council
referral does not have any impact on the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the
binding nature of Security Council actions under Chapter VII allows the Security
Council to extend the Court’s jurisdiction over the territory or nationals of a state
that has not ratified the Rome Statute); see also Heyder, supra note 7, at 654
(arguing that an in-depth analysis of Resolution 1593 is necessary in order to
determine the extent of the Court’s mandate in Sudan).
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that Resolution 1593 permits the Rome Statute’s immunity-stripping
Article 27 to apply to the Head of State of Sudan, a non-consenting,
non-State Party to the Rome Statute. 103
1. The Rome Statute and Security Council Resolution 1593 Provide
the Legal Basis for ICC Jurisdiction over Sudanese Nationals for
Crimes Committed in Sudan
Once the ICC’s authority over a general situation is activated
through one of the Article 13 trigger mechanisms, the two concepts
of jurisdiction and admissibility work to limit the ICC’s ability to
adjudicate specific cases. 104 In this scheme, the ICC’s jurisdiction
denotes the four legal parameters—“subject matter (jurisdiction
ratione materiae), time (jurisdiction ratione temporis), space
(jurisdiction ratione loci)[,] and . . . individuals (jurisdiction ratione
personae)”—over which the Court may properly exercise its
authority. 105 In contrast, the concept of admissibility, enshrined in
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, arises when the ICC must determine
whether it should exercise its authority in a specific case over which
the ICC possesses jurisdiction. 106 The structure of the Rome Statute
provides that either concept—jurisdiction or admissibility—may be

103. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (stripping those accused of crimes
under the Rome Statute of immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione
materiae, regardless of their position in a government).
104. Compare id. arts. 5, 11, 12 (establishing the limits of the Court’s
jurisdiction over subject matter, time, space, and individuals), with id. art. 17
(listing the cases when the Court should determine that a specific case is
inadmissible, including when a state has already initiated proceedings over the
accused).
105. Kim, supra note 7, at 111. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts.
5, 11, 12 (detailing the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, jurisdiction ratione
temporis, jurisdiction ratione loci, and jurisdiction ratione personae).
106. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1). Article 17 sets forth four
instances when the Court will find a specific case inadmissible: when a case is
already being prosecuted by a state with valid jurisdiction, unless that state is
“unwilling or unable” to “genuinely” carry out the prosecution; when a case has
been previously investigated by a state with valid jurisdiction and that state has
decided not to prosecute; when the person in question “has already been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint”; and when the case “is not of
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” Id. See, e.g., Kim, supra
note 7, at 111 (recognizing that there may be situations where the ICC has
jurisdiction over an issue, but would find cases arising from it inadmissible
because domestic proceedings had already been initiated).
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contested by an accused individual or a state with valid
jurisdiction. 107
a. The ICC Jurisdiction Granted under the Rome Statute is Insufficient to
Prosecute Nationals of Non-Consenting, Non-State Parties

Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”) provides that a treaty “does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent.” 108 Furthermore, a treaty
cannot create an obligation for a non-State Party unless that state
“expressly accepts that obligation in writing.” 109 Nothing in the
Rome Statute violates the VCLT because no article creates
obligations for non-State Parties. 110 Indeed, Article 12 of the Rome
Statute provides that when a State Party has referred a case to the
ICC or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation of his own
volition, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if the alleged crimes
were committed on the territory of a State Party or if the alleged
perpetrators are nationals of a State Party. 111
Thus, in the case of Sudan, it is evident that the plain text of the
Rome Statute, without more, is insufficient to support the ICC’s
jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals for crimes committed in
Sudan. 112 Although Sudan initially signed the Rome Statute, it never
ratified the agreement. 113 In addition, on August 27, 2008, the GoS

107. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19(2) (providing that a state may
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the state is investigating or
prosecuting the individual).
108. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
109. Id. art. 35.
110. See Chibueze, supra note 13, at 205-06 (arguing that the text of the Rome
Statute does not violate the Vienna Convention because the Rome Statute itself
does not create obligations for non-State Parties—it only allows them the option of
consenting to ICC jurisdiction).
111. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2); see Chibueze, supra note 13, at 20304 (asserting that, absent a Security Council referral, the Court’s jurisdiction is
limited to the territory or nationals of State Parties).
112. See Kim, supra note 7, at 131 (finding that the extent of the Court’s
authority with respect to non-State Parties is to “invite” them to assist the Court).
113. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary General, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/X
VIII-10.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (listing all state accessions, reservations,
or withdrawals from the Rome Statute).
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sent the Secretary General of the United Nations a communication
stating that “Sudan does not intend to become a party to the Rome
Statute. Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from its
signature on 8 September 2000.” 114 Because Sudan has specifically
withheld consent to obligations under the Rome Statute, the VCLT
bars the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on Sudanese
territory by Sudanese nationals without some further grant of
authority independent of the Rome Statute. 115
b. The Authority Needed for ICC Jurisdiction in Sudan is Derived from
Security Council Resolution 1593

The additional required authority is derived from Security Council
Resolution 1593, which invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in
referring the Darfur situation to the ICC. 116 The U.N. Charter
requires that all U.N. Member States carry out decisions made by the
Security Council. 117 Therefore, when the operative paragraphs of a
Security Council resolution made pursuant to Chapter VII authority
indicate a direct order, the resolution becomes “binding as law and
mandatory as policy” upon those states the resolution is directed

114. The Secretary-General, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Sudan: Notification, C.N.612.2008.TREATIES-6 (Depositary Notification) (Aug.
27, 2008), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2008/CN.612.
2008-Eng.pdf.
115. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12 (precluding the exercise of jurisdiction
in the territory or over nationals of non-State Parties to the Statute without express
consent from the non-State Party); see also Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and
Limits, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 618, 618-19 (2003) (describing the three instances
when the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-Parties: (1) as a result
of a Security Council referral, (2) when non-Party nationals have committed
crimes in the territory of a State Party, or the territory of a state that has consented
to the Court’s jurisdiction, and (3) when a non-State Party has consented to the
Court’s jurisdiction over a certain crime).
116. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, pmbl., ¶ 1 (recognizing the validity of the
Security Council’s actions under Chapter VII following a determination that Sudan
“continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security”); see also
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b) (allowing the court to exercise its
jurisdiction when a “situation . . . is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”).
117. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter.”).
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towards. 118 With respect to Sudan, it is clear that Resolution 1593 is a
direct order that obligates Sudan, as a U.N. Member State, to
cooperate with the ICC. 119 The second operative paragraph of
Resolution 1593 states that “the Government of Sudan and all other
parties to the conflict in Darfur[] shall cooperate fully with and
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor
pursuant to this resolution.” 120 In reliance on the wording of
Resolution 1593, and citing the authority derived from the U.N.
Charter, the ICC concluded that Sudan has an international
obligation to cooperate with the Court’s decisions emanating from
the situation in Darfur. 121
As Sudan is under an international obligation to cooperate with the
ICC and the Prosecutor, it follows that Sudan must also respect and
enforce the Prosecutor’s decisions about whom to prosecute. 122
118. Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law:
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 88 (1995) (discussing the sources of state
obligations to comply with requests from the ICTY and stating further that when
the Security Council issues a resolution framed as a command by using the word
“decides,” that resolution becomes a legal order binding upon U.N. Member
States); cf. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July
1997, ¶ 47 (Oct. 29, 1997) (determining that when the Security Council created the
ICTY using its Chapter VII authority, it established a “vertical relationship”
between the ICTY and states that confers primacy on the ICTY over domestic
courts).
119. See Joyner, supra note 118, at 88 (explaining that Security Council
resolutions with a direct imperative included in the operative paragraphs are
binding as law); see also Kim, supra note 7, at 114 (stressing the “mandatory
nature” of Security Council actions made under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter).
120. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
121. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 241-248 (noting further
that if Sudan chooses not to comply, the Court may refer the lack of compliance
back to the Security Council which may then choose to take further action as
authorized under the U.N. Charter); see also Prosecutor v. Harun & Al Abd-AlRahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application
under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ¶ 16 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279807.PDF (“[T]he Court may, where a
situation is referred to it by the Security Council, exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the territory of States which are not Party to the [Rome] Statute and
by nationals of States not Party to the [Rome] Statute.”).
122. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 242, 247 (highlighting
the fact that Al-Bashir’s prosecution stemmed from the Security Council’s referral
of the Darfur situation); Udombana, supra note 59, at 23-24 (arguing that when the
Security Council has referred a situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor is given the
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Unlike when the ICC’s jurisdiction is triggered by a State Party
referral or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation, there is no
subsequent article in the Rome Statute that defines the processes or
powers that flow from a Security Council referral. 123 It has been
argued that this was a purposeful omission that allows the Security
Council the widest latitude to act under Chapter VII and maintains
the Court’s independence by giving the Prosecutor the final say over
which individuals, if any, to prosecute pursuant to the grant of
jurisdiction. 124
Read concurrently, the jurisdictional articles of the Rome Statute
and Security Council Resolution 1593 provide sufficient
authorization for the Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute
Sudanese nationals for crimes committed in Sudan. 125 Resolution
1593, with its Chapter VII underpinnings, provides the Prosecutor
with the broad mandate to act in Sudan, while the Rome Statute
supplies the ability to target specific individuals for the commission
of specific crimes. 126 However, additional jurisdictional difficulties
arise when the alleged perpetrator of these crimes happens also to be
the sitting Head of State. 127

final decision over whether to initiate the Court’s jurisdiction over a specific case).
123. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 14 (stating that a State Party may refer
a situation to the Prosecutor in order to determine whether specific individuals
should be charged with crimes under the Rome Statute); id. art. 15 (listing the
powers of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on his own and the process to
follow).
124. See Udombana, supra note 59, at 16-17 (arguing that while the Security
Council has wide power to determine what actions to take under Chapter VII,
when the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor retains
discretion over whom to prosecute).
125. Cf. Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 115, at 618 (asserting that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of
non-State Parties when the Security Council has referred the situation to the
Court).
126. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 19 (highlighting that in the case of a
Security Council referral, non-State Parties to the Rome Statute may nevertheless
be bound by its provisions because of their U.N. membership and the obligations
that flow from it).
127. See Claire de Than & Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and
Human Rights 52-53 (2003) (describing the difficulties faced by a court attempting
to indict a current Head of State including his “technical” identification with the
state itself).

924

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:897

2. Resolution 1593 and Relevant International Cases Provide the
Necessary Authority for the ICC to Apply the Rome Statute’s
Immunity-Stripping Provisions to Al-Bashir
Article 27 of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that an “official
capacity as a Head of State or Government . . . shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility.” 128 Further,
“[i]mmunities . . . which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the
ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 129 Taken
together, these two provisions are intended to strip both immunity
ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae from suspects
brought before the ICC. 130 Thus, at first, it seems evident that if the
ICC has valid jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals, Al-Bashir’s
position as Head of State should not have any impact upon the ICC’s
jurisdiction over him.
a. Arguments Against the ICC’s Possessing the Power to Remove AlBashir’s Head of State Immunities

The automatic conclusion that Al-Bashir’s immunities are not
relevant before the ICC somewhat understates the nature and the
purpose of customary international law immunities as they relate to
courts established by a treaty in two important ways. 131 First, it
ignores the fact that although international immunities are designed
to shield individuals from foreign jurisdictions, the purpose of these
immunities has always been to protect states from judicial
proceedings to which they have not consented. 132 The ultimate owner

128. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27(1).
129. Id. art. 27(2).
130. See Kim, supra note 7, at 162 (stating that the drafters of the Rome Statute
easily came to agreement that all suspects before the court would be treated
equally, regardless of their official positions).
131. See generally Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at
415-19 (finding that the use of immunities as a prosecutorial bar in international
tribunals depends on the nature of the statute creating the tribunal, and whether the
state concerned is bound by it).
132. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 201 (emphasizing that state
representatives are afforded immunity in foreign courts in “recognition of the
dignity” of their home state).
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of the immunity, therefore, is not the individual but the state of
which he is a national. 133
Second, the above conclusion does not take sufficient account of
the fact that the ICC, unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) or the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), was established through a treaty and
not through a Chapter VII action taken by the United Nations. 134 This
is an important distinction because the power of an international
court to remove immunities is dependent upon the mechanism under
which it was created. 135 It is generally accepted that when the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
creates an international tribunal such as the ICTY or the ICTR, that
tribunal is empowered to disregard the immunities of nationals of all
U.N. Member States. 136 This power derives from the binding nature
of Security Council decisions and the notion that Member States, by
virtue of their ratification of the U.N. Charter, have indirectly
assented to the removal of immunities in such occasions. 137 When,
however, an international court has been created through a treaty
(like the ICC), its power to remove immunities is somewhat more
suspect. 138 If this were not the case a small number of states could
133. Cf. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International
Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International Arrest
Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone against the Liberian
President (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/
index.php?pr=1027&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1 (detailing the argument of the Liberian
government, which alleged that the arrest warrant issued by the SCSL for Charles
Taylor while he was the sitting president infringed upon Liberian sovereignty and
violated international law).
134. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 3 (establishing the ICC), with ICTY
Statute, supra note 72, ¶ 1 (recognizing Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of
February 22, 1993, which provided the basis for the ICTY), and S.C. Res. 955,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]
(establishing the ICTR).
135. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 34-35 (May 31, 2004) (acknowledging that the
powers of the SCSL are dependent upon the fact that the SCSL was created by a
treaty between the Security Council and Sierra Leone, and not directly by the
Security Council).
136. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417 (stating
that the ICTY and the ICTR possess the power to “remov[e] immunity with respect
to practically all states”).
137. Id.
138. See id. (asserting that immunities were designed to bar states from
interfering in the internal affairs of other states through prosecutions, and this
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create, via treaty, “an international criminal court for the purpose, or
with the effect, of circumventing the jurisdictional limitations
incumbent upon national courts.” 139 Although the Rome Statute does
have a significant number of State Parties, its ratification is not
universal, and so determining whether the ICC has the authority to
disregard the international immunities of non-State Party nationals
must be done with care. 140
b. Arguments in Favor of the ICC’s Power to Strip Al-Bashir’s Immunities

All of the above is not to say that the ICC cannot disregard the
immunities of non-State Party officials in certain situations; it only
shows that the Rome Statute does not grant the ICC automatic
authority to do so. 141 The ICC is unique among international
tribunals in that, although it was created by a treaty, Article 13(b)
allows the Security Council to use the ICC as a tool to maintain
international peace and security in specific situations. 142 When the
Security Council chooses to do so, at least with respect to the
immunities of nationals of the state (or states) in question, the
Security Council puts the ICC on equal footing with the ad hoc
tribunals. 143 This is premised on three legal underpinnings apart from
justification holds true even if the prosecuting states seek to exercise jurisdiction
through a united group).
139. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Submissions of the
Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity by Philippe Sands, ¶ 78 (Oct. 23,
2003), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/27928AD2-4ECB-461195B7-F9F0AE2DBF24/0/Sands.pdf (urging the SCSL to conclude that, because it
is an international tribunal similar in competence to the other criminal tribunals, it
has the authority to disregard the immunities of Charles Taylor).
140. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 441 (pointing out that only 104 of the 102
United Nations Member States have ratified or acceded to both the Rome Statue
and the ICC).
141. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12 (limiting the Court’s power to the
nationals or territory of State Parties in the absence of a Security Council referral).
142. See id. art. 13(b).
143. Cf. Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 45 (positing that, by
making the Article 13(b) referral, the Security Council understood that any
prosecutions would be conducted in accordance with the Rome Statute’s
provisions); Dapo Akande, The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State
Immune from ICC Prosecution? 3 (Oxford Transnational Justice Research,
Working Paper No. 6, 2008), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/
Akande.pdf (raising the possibility that when the Security Council obligated Sudan
to cooperate with the ICC in Resolution 1593, this canceled Al-Bashir’s
immunities).
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the Rome Statute: the mandatory nature of the U.N. Charter, the
ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant Case, and the SCSL’s decision
regarding immunities in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor. 144
It is clear that the ICC, unlike the ICTY or ICTR, was created by a
treaty and not by a Security Council resolution. The ICC, therefore,
normally operates as an independent entity without inherent authority
to disregard the immunities conferred by non-States Parties of the
Rome Statute. 145 However, because the Security Council acted under
Chapter VII in referring the Darfur situation to the ICC, the Court’s
jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals is anchored in the U.N.
Charter. 146 This anchor, and the international obligation that
Resolution 1593 places on Sudan to cooperate with the Court,
position the ICC in a vertical relationship with Sudan, permitting the
Court to disregard Al-Bashir’s immunities without violating
international law. 147
144. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (requiring Member States to comply with Security
Council resolutions); Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 25-26 (insinuating
that international courts such as the ICC could remove immunities in the proper
circumstances); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 1, 42, 53, 60 (May 31, 2004) (denying Taylor’s
motion to quash his indictment based on Head of State immunity after determining
that the SCSL was an international criminal court and, as a result, Taylor’s position
as incumbent Head of State was not a bar to his prosecution).
145. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. (recognizing the independence of
the Court with respect to the U.N. system); see also Al-Bashir Warrant Decision,
supra note 3, ¶ 240 (noting that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute and has
therefore not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory); cf. Akande,
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417 (presenting the ICTY and
ICTR as examples of Security Council-created mechanisms that can remove the
immunities of U.N. Member State nationals).
146. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (allowing the Security Council to take action
when peace is threatened or breached or an act of aggression has occurred, and
providing the Security Council with the means to do so, both through authorizing
the use of force and through other measures); Heyder, supra note 7, at 652-53
(asserting that when the ICC’s jurisdiction over a situation is based on a Chapter
VII referral from the Security Council, the Court’s jurisdiction is universal, and the
state’s consent is irrelevant).
147. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (ordering the government of Sudan to
cooperate with and provide assistance to the ICC); Al-Bashir Warrant Decision,
supra note 3, ¶¶ 241-247 (asserting that although Sudan has not ratified the Rome
Statute, it remains under an international obligation to cooperate with the ICC
because of the binding language of Resolution 1593 and Sudan’s duties under the
U.N. Charter); see also Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (determining that when the Security Council creates a court
with the goal of keep international peace, it may force the United Nations to
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The ICC’s power to remove Al-Bashir’s immunities by applying
Article 27 of the Rome Statute is reinforced by the Arrest Warrant
Case. 148 There, the ICJ went to great lengths to separate “immunity”
from “impunity” and specifically mentioned Article 27 when putting
forth the ICC as a venue for holding state officials accountable if
international immunities prevented domestic courts from
prosecution. 149 Further, in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the Appeals
Chamber held that the SCSL, as an international court created by a
treaty between the Security Council and Sierra Leone, possessed
authority to remove Taylor’s international immunities, even though
he was an incumbent Head of State at the time his arrest warrant was
issued. 150
Together, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 and the Rome
Statute provide the foundation for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
over Sudanese nationals. 151 These two documents, reinforced by
relevant international case law, provide the ICC with the power to
ignore Al-Bashir’s immunities as Head of State and issue a warrant

participate).
148. See generally Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 25-26 (stating clearly
that the Court is not barred from having jurisdiction if Article 27 is applied).
149. See id. at 25 (stating that immunity does not “exonerate” an individual of
criminal responsibility and listing the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC as valid venues
for holding an incumbent foreign minister accused of war crimes accountable, if
these tribunals had jurisdiction).
150. See Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (underscoring the importance of the fact that the Security
Council was acting under its Chapter VII authority when it decided to enter into
the agreement with Sierra Leone); see also Micaela Frulli, The Question of Charles
Taylor’s Immunity: Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal
Immunities?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1118, 1120-21 (2004) (describing that while
the Security Council did not vest the SCSL with Chapter VII authority, the judges
found that because the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII when the
SCSL was established, this was enough to provide the court with an international
character). Frulli criticizes the SCSL judges for, once having established that the
SCSL is an international tribunal created under the context of Chapter VII, failing
to utilize Chapter VII authority as a basis for disregarding Taylor’s immunities,
instead relying on the distinction between national and international courts. Id. at
1123; J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 37, 101-02 (arguing that the
SCSL’s decision on immunities was one of the court’s most significant
accomplishments).
151. See supra Part II.A.1 (concluding that the ICC’s jurisdiction over Darfur is
valid in light of the mandatory nature of Security Council Resolution 1593).
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for his arrest. 152 Now that the ICC judges have decided to pursue this
course of action, the question becomes how Al-Bashir’s warrant can
be executed. 153

B. THE ICC’S RELIANCE ON DOMESTIC PROCESSES TO CARRY OUT
ITS WARRANTS AND THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY RESOLUTION
1593 MAY PREVENT THE EXECUTION OF AN ARREST WARRANT
BECAUSE OF AL-BASHIR’S HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITIES
Although the ICC, as demonstrated above, has the legal authority
to prosecute President Al-Bashir for crimes committed in Darfur, its
ability to do so hinges on the enforceability of any warrant issued for
his arrest. 154 The Rome Statute prevents trials in absentia; therefore
Al-Bashir’s physical presence in The Hague is essential before the
Court can move on to the merits of the Prosecutor’s case. 155 The
ICC, however, does not have any enforcement mechanism of its
own, and as a result, the Court is completely dependent upon states
to carry out arrests on its behalf. 156 Many commentators have
worried that the Court’s lack of independent enforcement
capabilities, along with the apparent disparities between Articles 27
and 98 of the Rome Statute, could lead to situations in which the ICC
is unable to initiate trials against those most responsible for
152. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that recent cases in the ICJ and the SCSL
support the finding that the ICC has the authority to lift Al-Bashir’s Head of State
immunities).
153. Pondai Bamu, Head of State Immunity and ICC: Can Bashir be
Prosecuted? 2 (Oxford Transnational Justice Research, Working Paper No. 7,
2008), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/BamuF.pdf (raising
practical difficulties the ICC faces if it decided to issue a warrant for Al-Bashir,
including the reliance on states for enforcement of ICC warrants and previous
failures to apprehend ICC suspects in Uganda).
154. Cf. Chibueze, supra note 13, at 209-11 (commenting that the effectiveness
of the ICC depends on states’ fulfilling their obligations to arrest and surrender
those accused of crimes to the ICC).
155. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 63(1) (“The accused shall be present
during the trial.”). But see Kim, supra note 7, at 212 (determining that the presence
of the accused is only required at the trial, and not during pretrial proceedings).
156. See Nick Donovan, Introduction: Enforcement of International Criminal
Law, in Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law 3, 9 (Nick
Donovan ed., 2009), available at http://www.aegistrust.org/images/PDFs/
enforcement_of_international_criminal_law.pdf (characterizing the dearth of
enforcement capabilities as the “‘Achilles’ heel’” of the ICC); Kirsch, supra note
13, at 291 (stating that trials before the Court can only occur if states cooperate
with the Court’s requests).
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international crimes. 157 Sudan’s refusal to apprehend Ahmed Harun
and Ali Kushayb despite ICC arrest warrants shows that such
concerns are especially pertinent in any discussion about the
possibilities of trying Al-Bashir in The Hague. 158
Practically speaking, there are four primary ways that Al-Bashir
could appear before the ICC judges in response to his arrest warrant.
First, Al-Bashir could turn himself in to the Prosecutor. 159 Given AlBashir’s animosity toward the ICC and rejection of the charges
against him, this is extremely unlikely. 160 Second, the Sudanese
authorities could arrest and extradite him to The Hague. 161 Even
though Resolution 1593 places an obligation on Sudan to comply
with the Court’s requests, 162 and there appear to be some anti-AlBashir rumblings in Khartoum, 163 without a complete regime change
this option seems out of the question. 164 Third, Al-Bashir could be
157. See, e.g., Simbeye, supra note 10, at 2 (lamenting that while Article 27 of
the Rome Statute makes an individual’s official status irrelevant before the ICC,
Article 98 makes official status pertinent when states are acting to apprehend that
individual); Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 420 (noting
that because the ICC does not have the power to arrest suspects on its own it must
rely on states to do so, in which case the official immunities enjoyed by the suspect
could become relevant to national court proceedings); Chibueze, supra note 13, at
210 (asserting that the Court’s credibility could be damaged if states failed or
refused to enforce the Court’s warrants).
158. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking
Global Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 222 (2007-2008) (underscoring
that in failing to arrest and surrender Harun and Kushayb, Sudan is in violation of
its legal obligations).
159. See Flint & de Waal, This Prosecution Will Endanger the People, supra
note 6 (stating that an ICC warrant for Al-Bashir will be effective only if Al-Bashir
surrenders, is arrested, or is ousted from power).
160. See UN Split Over Darfur Peace Force, BBC News, July 29, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7530501.stm (reporting that Al-Bashir is
unworried by the ICC’s “politically motivated” charges).
161. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 158, at 222 (recognizing that while the
Sudanese government has discussed the possible surrender of Ahmad Harun, no
similar discussions have been held with regard to Al-Bashir, nor is it likely that
they will).
162. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (obligating Sudan to cooperate with
the ICC).
163. See Amber Henshaw, Will Warrant Tip Sudan into Abyss?, BBC News,
Mar. 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7887007.stm (reporting rumors of a
coup against Al-Bashir but noting that members of Al-Bashir’s party continue to
support him for now).
164. See A Dilemma over Darfur, supra note 6 (describing how Al-Bashir’s
ruling party has called the prosecutor’s charges “blackmail” and threatened more
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arrested and extradited by an international force in Sudan with the
specific mandate to do so. 165 Alhough there is a U.N. force in Darfur
(“UNAMID”), its mandate is currently limited to protecting civilians
and supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement. 166 Fourth, Al-Bashir could be arrested pursuant to an
ICC warrant while in the territory of a third state, and then extradited
from that state to The Hague for trial. 167 Although this option
presents serious difficulties, it has historical precedent—both Charles
Taylor and Ugarte Pinochet were arrested in third states and then
extradited to stand trial. 168 The viability of this fourth option is
discussed for the remainder of this Section.
1. The Conflict between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute
Create the Possibility that an ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir Will Be
Unenforceable While He is in Power
The first concern about the enforceability of Al-Bashir’s arrest
warrant is created by the structure of the Rome Statute itself. 169
Article 27 of the Statute provides that neither the official capacity
violence in Darfur should the ICC issue a warrant). But see Flint & de Waal, This
Prosecution Will Endanger the People, supra note 6 (asserting the unlikelihood of
a regime change in Sudan given Al-Bashir’s grip on power and the weakness of the
political opposition).
165. See generally Han-Ru Zhou, The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by
International Forces, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 202, 205-08 (2006) (outlining the legal
rationale of the ICTY in legitimizing the use of multi-national forces, including
NATO, to enforce the court’s arrest warrants).
166. See S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) (declaring
further that UNAMID must fulfill its mandate “without prejudice” to the
responsibilities of the Sudanese government).
167. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 420-21
(claiming that the most probable way that the Court will get custody over an
accused is through the cooperation of third party states).
168. See id.; Craig Timberg, Liberia’s Taylor Found and Arrested, WASH. POST,
Mar. 30, 2006, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/29/AR2006032900879.html (describing Taylor’s
apprehension in Nigeria, transfer to and arrest in Liberia, and extradition to Sierra
Leone). See generally Pinochet III, supra note 63 (extraditing Pinochet from the
U.K. to Spain to stand trial on charges of torture); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶ 57 (May 31, 2004)
(upholding the validity of a SCSL warrant issued for Liberian President Taylor that
was supposed to be executed in Ghana).
169. See generally Simbeye, supra note 10, at 135-36 (arguing for the need to
balance holding international criminals accountable through Article 27 with
granting Heads of State a degree of protection under Article 98).
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nor the international immunities of an accused are relevant
considerations in proceedings before the Court. 170 In stark contrast,
Article 98(1) prohibits the Court from requesting a state to arrest and
surrender a third party national if doing so would violate the
requested state’s “obligations under international law with respect to
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person.” 171 A straight reading
of the two articles creates a logical knot of Gordian proportions—the
court tasked with ending impunity for the perpetrators of the most
serious international crimes is prevented from requesting a state to
surrender those perpetrators if they are officials of another state. 172
In the case of Al-Bashir, this inconsistency may mean that the
Court has issued a warrant that cannot be enforced while Al-Bashir is
in power. 173 Although the loophole created by the disparity between
Articles 27 and 98(1) should not apply to nationals of ICC Member
States, commentators have concluded that an official’s immunities
conferred by a non-State Party would present a bar to the Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over that person. 174 The only meaningful way
around this obstacle is for the Court to obtain a waiver of immunity
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (specifically mentioning the
irrelevance of “official capacity as a Head of State” in proceedings before the
ICC).
171. Id. art. 98(1).
172. See, e.g., Simbeye, supra note 10, at 30 (highlighting the contradiction that
the Court could have jurisdiction over an individual but be completely barred from
arresting that person because of the immunities he enjoys before national courts);
Paola Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities, in The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, supra note 98, at 975, 992 (detailing
the possibility that Article 98 could prevent the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over state officials in contradiction of the language of Article 27(2)).
173. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 421 (arguing
that, with respect to the immunities of nationals of non-State Parties to the Rome
Statute, the ICC would be prohibited by international law from acting in a way that
would violate these immunities).
174. Compare Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 425
(concluding that Article 98(1) must be read in a way that allows the Court to
request the arrest and surrender of officials of State-Parties because, by signing the
Rome Statute, states consented to Article 27), and Gaeta, supra note 172, at 99394 (finding that Article 27 would be rendered “meaningless” if the Court could not
request the arrest and surrender of officials of State Parties), with Akande,
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 421-22 (stating that under Article
98(1), the immunities of non-State Party nationals prevent the ICC from requesting
State Parties for their arrest), and Gaeta, supra note 172, at 994 (arguing that the
limitations imposed by Article 98(1) should only apply to non-State Party
officials).
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from the official’s home state. 175 Given Sudan’s hostility to the
Prosecutor’s charges and the fact that Al-Bashir is in de facto control
of Sudan’s government, a waiver of his Head of State immunity
appears highly unlikely. 176
2. The Limited Language of Security Council Resolution 1593 Does
Not Impose the International Obligation on States to Cooperate with
the ICC that is Necessary to Overcome State Deference to
International Immunities
As noted above, the ICC, as a tribunal created through an
international treaty and not through a Security Council resolution,
does not have the automatic authority to disregard immunities,
especially when it comes to officials of non-State Parties. 177 In cases
where there will be a conflict between a State Party’s duties under
the Rome Statute and its obligation to respect the immunities of a
third state official, the ICC is prevented from forcing the state to
choose which international obligation it will fulfill, and which it will
violate. 178 This limitation is not a concern with respect to the ad hoc
tribunals 179 —as they are subsidiary bodies to the U.N., the ICTY and

175. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98(1) (allowing the Court to request
the surrender of a third state official if the Court can obtain a waiver of immunity
from the third state).
176. Cf. Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶¶ 264-268 (describing the
extent of Al-Bashir’s control over the Sudanese state, including its political,
security, and military mechanisms); Flint & de Waal, This Prosecution Will
Endanger the People, supra note 6 (illustrating Sudan’s and Al-Bashir’s rejection
of the ICC charges).
177. Compare Simbeye, supra note 10, at 33 (explaining that the ICTY and
ICTR are “supra-state” tribunals that have the independent authority to “issue
binding orders to states and can enforce compliance”), with Annalisa Ciampi, The
Obligation to Cooperate, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A Commentary, supra note 98, at 1607, 1631-32 (recognizing that the obligation
of states to cooperate with the ICC does not necessarily prevail over their preexisting international obligations to respect immunities of third state officials).
178. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98(1) (prohibiting the Court from
requiring states to “act inconsistently with [their]obligations under international
law”); Gaeta, supra note 172, at 994 (arguing that the provisions of Article 98(1)
prevent the Court from asking a member state to violate its international
obligations to a third, non-State Party by arresting an official of that third state).
179. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July
1997, ¶ 26 (Oct. 29, 1997) (holding that when the Security Council created the
ICTY pursuant to Chapter VII, it created erga omnes obligations on the part of all
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ICTR are imbued with the authority of the U.N. Charter. 180 This
means that in cases of conflict between an order from one of the
tribunals and a state’s existing international obligations, the
tribunal’s order takes primacy. 181
When compared with the Security Council resolutions that created
the ICTY and the ICTR, and established the SCSL by agreement
with Sierra Leone, the language of Resolution 1593 is less broad. 182
Although Resolution 1593 is explicit in authorizing the ICC to
exercise jurisdiction over Sudanese territory and nationals, its
language is more limited when it comes to obligating states other
than Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. 183 Indeed, Resolution 1593
recognizes that, other than Sudan, non-State Parties to the Rome
Statute have no obligations with respect to the ICC and only “urges”
all states to assist the ICC. 184 Because it does not bind all U.N.
Member States in its operative paragraphs, the limited language of
Resolution 1593 is insufficient to support a finding that there exists a

U.N. Member States to comply with the provisions of the ICTY Statute).
180. See Pham, supra note 150, at 80-81 (noting the differences between the
SCSL and the ICTY/ICTR, including the SCSL’s creation through a treaty, which
means that it does not hold primacy over state courts like the ICTY and ICTR did,
and operates independently of the U.N. system).
181. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (stating that the obligations of U.N. Member
States under the U.N. Charter trump any other international obligations); Bert
Swart, Arrest and Surrender, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary, supra note 198, at 1639, 1664 (describing how an ICTY
order is considered to be an “enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations” and therefore requires all U.N. Member States to
comply with that order).
182. Compare S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (ordering that only those states
party to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with the Court and simply
“urg[ing]” other states to do so), with ICTR Statute, supra note 134, ¶ 2 (ordering
all states to “cooperate fully” with the ICTR “and that consequently all States shall
take measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions
of . . . the Statute”), and S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14,
2000) (affirming that the international community will “exert every effort” to bring
the perpetrators of international crimes committed in Sierra Leone to justice), and
S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (deciding that “all states
shall cooperate fully” with the ICTY, which includes “comply[ing] with requests
for assistance or orders”).
183. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2.
184. Id.
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general international obligation to cooperate with the ICC’s efforts in
Sudan. 185
In the absence of a general international obligation to cooperate
with the ICC in cases arising out of Darfur, any state seeking to
execute Al-Bashir’s warrant would be prevented from doing so by
the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant Case decision. There, the ICJ held that
incumbent foreign ministers (and, by extension, Heads of State) with
immunity rationae personae are absolutely inviolable and immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts, even when they are
suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. 186
Ironically, the very case that provided support to the conclusion that
the ICC may legitimately disregard Al-Bashir’s immunities presents
a seemingly insurmountable hurdle to his actual arrest and
extradition by domestic authorities. 187 If an ICC warrant for AlBashir is to have any teeth, significant steps are necessary to ensure
the Rome Statute’s pledge that “the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished.” 188

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the serious enforcement issues raised by Al-Bashir’s
warrant, there are three specific actions the international community
should take to ensure that the ICC has the ability to fulfill its current
mandate in Sudan and in future situations referred to the Court by the
Security Council. In the short term, the Security Council should
resist calls to defer the ICC’s proceedings in Sudan. Second, the
Security Council should support the ICC’s efforts by issuing a
resolution requiring all U.N. Member States to enforce the ICC’s
decisions arising out of the situation in Darfur. Finally, in the long
term, the international community should consider amending Article
185. See Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-55 (noting that the language of Resolution
1593 creates an inconsistency whereby the Court is authorized to exercise its
jurisdiction in Sudan, but no states other than Sudan are ordered to support the
ICC’s mandate).
186. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 24.
187. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (stating that the precedent set by the Arrest
Warrant Case prevents states from acting on an ICC warrant for Al-Bashir, and
criticizing the ICC for often ignoring that it is dependant upon states, which often
have international obligations that pre-date the Court).
188. Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
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98 of the Rome Statute to clarify that when the Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to a Security Council referral, all U.N. Member States are
obligated to enforce the ICC’s decisions, regardless of whether they
have signed the Rome Statute.

A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD AVOID DEFERRING ALBASHIR’S ICC PROCEEDING
Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides a mechanism that permits
the Security Council to postpone an ICC proceeding for one year. 189
Even before the Court issued Al-Bashir’s warrant, various parties
urged the Security Council to defer the proceedings, and these calls
have only become more insistent since the Court issued its
decision. 190 The central thrust of these arguments is that although AlBashir’s past conduct is deplorable, he is an essential component of
any peace arrangements in Sudan, and his arrest could create a
vacuum filled with more violence. 191 Regional bodies such as the
African Union and the Arab League also oppose the warrant because
they see Al-Bashir’s indictment as somewhat of a double standard
that “unfairly” singles out Sudan. 192
While recognizing that such concerns have validity, the Security
Council must not defer the Court’s proceedings for two overriding
reasons. First, postponing Al-Bashir’s charges would give implicit
international sanction to the “climate of impunity” that fosters the
perpetration of crimes against humanity. 193 Since 1945, when the

189. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16 (stipulating that the Security
Council must adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to
halt the investigations).
190. See, e.g., Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67 (describing
lobbying efforts at the U.N. in favor of a deferral by a group of Arab and African
ministers); Franklin Graham, Op-Ed., Put Peace Before Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2009, at A27 (insisting that a Security Council deferral is necessary to achieve
peace in the region).
191. See, e.g., Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67 (reporting that
those advocating for a Security Council deferral argue that it would help to achieve
peace in Darfur); Graham, supra note 190 (maintaining that Al-Bashir was critical
to the peace accords that brought an end to the civil war in South Sudan, and he
has shown a willingness to “cooperate” with aid groups).
192. See UN Split over Darfur Peace Force, supra note 160 (describing efforts
led by South Africa and Libya to have the Security Council defer the ICC’s
decision on Al-Bashir’s arrest warrant).
193. Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67.
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world first vowed that crimes like the Holocaust would “never be
allowed to happen again,” it has broken that promise time after time
in country after country. 194 By some accounts, the present worldwide
number of “those suspected of war crimes and crimes against
humanity could run into the hundreds of thousands.” 195 Of that
group, at least several thousand suspects were in positions of
command when the crimes were committed. 196 Should the Security
Council defer Al-Bashir’s ICC proceedings—it would legitimize his
impunity and set a dangerous precedent for future perpetrators. 197 If
so, once again, the world’s post-Holocaust vow would prove to be
nothing more than empty rhetoric. 198
Second, allowing the desire for peace to swallow the need for
justice and accountability ignores that in the past, peace and justice
have not proven to be mutually exclusive concepts, and instead can
work to reinforce each other. 199 In both Serbia and Liberia, the
international prosecutions of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor
undermined the authority of the criminal Heads of State, paving the
way for eventual lasting peace in both countries. 200 Moreover, on
both occasions, there was fear that the international prosecutions

194. Scott Lamb, Never Again?, Spiegel Online, Jan. 26, 2005,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,338612,00.html (outlining the promise
made after World War II and recounting situations where it has been ignored
including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur).
195. Donovan, supra note 156, at 3 (providing a rough estimate of the number
of suspects by combining figures from Rwanda, Darfur, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Guatemala, among others).
196. Id.
197. See Caroline Flintoft & Nick Grono, The Politics of Ending Impunity, in
Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law, supra note 156, at
16, 18-19 (arguing that Article 16 deferrals should only be used as a “last resort”
because of the possible damage to the Court’s authority, credibility, and deterrent
capacity).
198. See Lamb, supra note 194.
199. See Flintoft & Grono, supra note 197, at 18 (positing that peace and justice
efforts can proceed in tandem and pointing to Uganda and Sudan as two
examples).
200. See Tracey Gurd, Arresting the “Big Fish”: Lessons on State Cooperation
for the International Criminal Court, in Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of
International Criminal Law, supra note 156, at 27, 28-29, 30-31 (describing the
international prosecution and arrest of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor and
how these prosecutions led to internal pressure that eventually ousted both
presidents).
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would endanger ongoing peace efforts, and on both occasions this
fear was proven baseless. 201

B. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST ISSUE A DEFINITIVE
RESOLUTION OBLIGATING ALL U.N. MEMBER STATES TO
ENFORCE ICC WARRANTS THAT ARISE OUT OF THE DARFUR
CONFLICT
To be effective and maintain its credibility, the ICC must be
allowed to operate as an independent body that is not swayed by
political pressures or subsumed into a subordinate of the U.N. 202 The
Security Council, therefore, must unequivocally throw its weight
behind the Court’s actions in Sudan. 203 To do this, the Security
Council should issue a resolution requiring the entire international
community, not just the states that are parties to the conflict in
Darfur, to assist the ICC as it carries out its proceedings against AlBashir. 204 Such a resolution would reinforce the Court’s mandate in
Sudan and put additional domestic pressure on Al-Bashir. 205
A definitive resolution of this nature would also greatly help to
resolve the serious doubts about the practical enforcement of the
ICC’s warrant for Al-Bashir. 206 When the Security Council places a
legal obligation on states through an explicit resolution, that duty
takes precedence over all pre-existing international obligations. 207 If

201. See Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67.
202. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 158, at 224 (“The Prosecutor’s duty is to
apply the law without bowing to political considerations, and I will not adjust my
practices to political considerations. It is time for political actors to adjust to the
law.”); Phil Clark, If Ocampo Indicts Bashir, Nothing May Happen 1 (Oxford
Transitional Justice Research, Working Paper No. 1, July 13, 2008), available at
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Clark_Final.pdf (declaring that the ICC must
indict Al-Bashir in order preserve its legitimacy in Darfur and fulfill its mandate in
Sudan).
203. Cf. Udombana, supra note 62, at 50 (calling upon the Security Council to
support the ICC by mobilizing a peacekeeping force in Sudan and by issuing a
resolution sanctioning Sudan if it does not cooperate with the Court).
204. Cf. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (requiring only the cooperation of the
GoS and other parties to the conflict in Darfur).
205. See Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-56 (illustrating how the Security
Council’s failure to include a universal obligation in Resolution 1593 weakens the
Prosecutor’s position in pressuring Sudan to turn over suspects to the Court).
206. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (asserting that it is unlikely that “any state
can arrest [Al-]Bashir without violating the international law on immunity”).
207. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the
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there were such a universal obligation to cooperate with the ICC’s
activities in Sudan, U.N. Member States could act to execute an ICC
arrest warrant for Al-Bashir without concern that doing so would
violate their obligations to respect the immunities conferred by
Sudan. 208 The Prosecutor could also use such a resolution in the
courts of any State or non-State Party to the Rome Statute and be
assured of its compliance with the ICC warrant. 209

C. ARTICLE 98 OF THE ROME STATUTE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO
ENSURE THAT WHEN THE ICC’S JURISDICTION IS TRIGGERED BY A
SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL, ALL STATES ARE
INTERNATIONALLY OBLIGATED TO ENFORCE ICC WARRANTS
One of the envisioned functions of the ICC was to act as a
permanent tribunal that the Security Council could activate using its
Chapter VII authority without the need to set up another ad hoc
tribunal such as the ICTY or ICTR. 210 The benefits provided by this
process are manifold. First, a permanent court that simply needs
activation by the Security Council to act in a given situation
drastically eliminates the expense and reduces the time needed to
build a tribunal from the ground up. 211 Second, the ICC has the
ability to compile a significant body of case law that can be used in
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.”).
208. See Udombana, supra note 62, at 49 (declaring that when a state carries out
a Security Council enforcement measure, it becomes an agent of the Security
Council and its authority to act flows directly from the U.N. Charter).
209. See Joyner, supra note 121, at 88-89 (stating that when the Security
Council issues a binding resolution, the provisions of that resolution carry the force
of law for U.N. Member States); see generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, art.
59(2) (requiring a custodial state to conduct arrest proceedings in national courts to
determine whether the ICC warrant is applicable to the specific person, whether
the suspect was provided with the proper process during the arrest, and whether the
rights of the arrested person have been respected); id. art. 89(1) (requiring State
Parties to comply with their national laws when enforcing an ICC arrest warrant);
id. art. 93(1) (requiring State Parties to comply with their national laws when
assisting the Court in other ways).
210. See Condorelli & Villalpando, supra note 105, at 628 (characterizing the
ICC as an “ad hoc permanent” international court that provides the Security
Council with immediate access to a judicial body).
211. See Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil
Society Achievement 12-13 (2006) (describing the “slow start[s]” of the ICTY and
the ICTR that were the result of inadequate funding and diplomatic arguments).
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future situations and thus eventually reduces the number of cases of
first impression that the Court must decide. 212 Finally, a permanent
tribunal gives the Security Council the flexibility to act immediately
in a given situation, which could potentially reduce the number or
severity of crimes. 213
The ICC, when activated by the Security Council, needs to have
the same autonomous authority ad hoc tribunals have in order for any
of these benefits to be realized. 214 One way to provide for this
authority is by amending Article 98 of the Rome Statute. This could
be done by adding a provision stating that when the ICC’s
jurisdiction over a situation has been activated by a Security Council
referral under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, all states are
obligated to cooperate with the ICC. 215 The obligation would extend
to all U.N. Member States, but would be limited solely to the ICC’s
requests and orders arising out of the specific situation referred. 216
Thus, in practice, the authority of the ICC in such a situation would
be identical to the authority enjoyed by the ad hoc tribunals: limited
to the specific conflict in question, but extensive in the depth of state
obligations to the Court. 217

212. Cf. William R. Pace & Jennifer Schense, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary, supra note 98, at 105, 106 (commenting that the Rome Statute has
resulted in the clarification and codification of many aspects of international
criminal law).
213. See Condorelli & Villalpando, supra note 105, at 627 (arguing that from
the very inception of the ICC, it was envisioned that the Security Council would
use the Court as a tool to maintain international peace and security).
214. See Swart, supra note 183, at 1664 (describing the power of the ICTY to
order states to comply with its requests).
215. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July
1997, ¶ 26 (Oct. 29, 1997) (holding that when the Security Council created the
ICTY it imposed erga omnes obligations on all U.N. Member States to comply
with the ICTY Statute); U.N. Charter art. 103 (stipulating that states’ obligations
that arise under the U.N. Charter take precedence over all other international
obligations).
216. See Udombana, supra note 62, at 49 (arguing that when the Security
Council refers a situation to the ICC under Chapter VII, with respect to that
specific situation, the Security Council alters the nature of the ICC from a
horizontal, treaty-based institution, to a vertical, supra-national body).
217. See Joyner, supra note 121, at 88-89 (describing how the ICTY Statute
obligates all U.N. Member States to comply with orders and requests emanating
from the ICTY with regard to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia).
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CONCLUSION
In the end, it may well be that the Prosecutor’s application serves a
more political rather than judicial purpose. 218 The practicalities of
arresting Al-Bashir, and the repercussions that could arise from a
power vacuum caused by his sudden imprisonment, may prove to be
insurmountable obstacles to the execution of the ICC’s warrant. 219
These realities, however, do not excuse the international community
of its solemn obligation to “establish conditions under which
justice . . . can be maintained.” 220 By creating the ICC and then by
referring the violence in Darfur to that Court’s jurisdiction, the
international community dealt the ICC a hand of cards to play. In
turn, the Court placed its chips on the table. All that now remains to
be seen is how the other players will react.

218. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (theorizing that the ICC Prosecutor may
have requested the arrest warrant in order to pressure Al-Bashir into peace
negotiations in Darfur).
219. See id. (asserting that Al-Bashir’s immunities most likely will prevent his
arrest and surrender to the ICC).
220. U.N. Charter pmbl.

